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Abstract
This paper studies the role of family background in explaining differences in
the willingness to compete. By combining data from a lab experiment conducted
with a representative sample of adolescents in Norway and high quality register
data on family background, we show that family background is fundamental in
two important ways. First, boys from low socioeconomic status families are less
willing to compete than boys from better off families, even when controlling for
confidence, performance, risk preferences, time preferences, social preferences,
and psychological traits. Second, family background is crucial for understanding
the large gender difference in the willingness to compete. Girls are much less
willing to compete than boys among children from better off families, whereas we
do not find any gender difference in willingness to compete among children from
low socioeconomic status families. Our data suggest that the main mechanism
explaining the role of family background is that the father’s socioeconomic status
has a large effect on the boys’ willingness to compete, but no effect on the girls.
We do not find any effect on the willingness to compete for boys or girls of the
mother’s socioeconomic status or other family characteristic that may potentially
shape competition preferences, including parental equality and sibling rivalry.
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A growing experimental literature has identified a significant gender difference in the
willingness to compete, where females typically are more competition averse than
males (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011). This may poten-
tially explain a wide range of real world economic phenomena, including observed
gender differences in educational and occupational choices, and brings a new di-
mension into the public debate on gender-equalizing policies (Bertrand, 2011; Buser,
Niederle, and Oosterbeek, Forthcoming; Flory, Leibbrandt, and List, 2010; Niederle
and Vesterlund, 2010; Zhang, 2012). But why do males and females differ in their
willingness to compete?
The novel contribution of the present paper is that we study how competition pref-
erences relate to family background. We use a unique data set combining experimental
data on the willingness to compete in a representative sample of Norwegian adoles-
cents in the 9th grade (14-15 years old), who are soon to make important choices about
whether to pursue a vocational or academic track in high school, with high quality reg-
ister data on parents’ income and education. We establish that family background is
fundamental in two important ways. First, there is a strong socioeconomic gradient in
competition preferences. As shown in the left panel in Figure 1, children from low so-
cioeconomic status (SES) families are much less willing to compete than children from
medium or high SES families, and this result holds even when controlling for confi-
dence, performance, risk- and time preferences, social preferences, and psychological
traits.1 Second, family background is crucial for understanding the gender difference
in competition preferences. As shown in the right panel in Figure 1, girls from well-off
families are much less willing to compete than boys from well-off families, while we
do not find a statistically significant gender difference in competitiveness preferences
among children from families with low socioeconomic status. These results are also
robust to the inclusion of our set of background variables.
[ Figure 1 about here. ]
We also provide evidence suggesting that the main mechanism explaining the im-
pact of family background is the role of the father in shaping the competition prefer-
ences of the boys. As can be seen from the right panel in Figure 1, boys from low
SES families are much less willing to compete than boys from medium and high SES
families, and we find that this relationship is driven by the socioeconomic status of
the father. We do not find a similar relationship between fathers and girls, and, more
generally, the competition preferences of the girls appear not to be sensitive to fam-
ily background. Further, we consider other family characteristics that may potentially
1We focus on the comparison between low SES families and the rest in the following analysis. As
shown in Figure A1 in Appendix A, the differences in the willingness to compete between children
from medium SES and high SES families are small. There is a slight socioeconomic gradient, but no
difference in the gender gap in the two groups.
2
shape competition preferences, including parental equality, sibling rivalry, and birth
order, but for none of these characteristics do we find a strong effect on the willingness
to compete.
Our findings contribute to the growing literature on what shapes competition pref-
erences and have implications for the discussion of which institutional arrangements
to introduce in response to observed differences in the willingness to compete (Bal-
afoutas and Sutter, 2012). In a recent important study, Gneezy, Leonard, and List
(2009) provide evidence showing that the culture of a society plays an important role
in shaping people’s willingness to compete; they find that the gender gap is reversed
in the matrilineal culture of the Khasi in India, where more females than males select
into a competitive environment.2 In light of this finding, they argue in favor of pub-
lic policies targeting socialization and education early in life to eliminate the gender
gap in competition preferences. An interesting aspect of the present study is that it
is conducted in a Scandinavian country that for a long time has implemented gender
equalizing policies. In 2012, Norway ranked highest on the gender equality index
of the UN comprising measures of educational attainment, labor market participation,
and health, which is consistent with our not observing any gender differences in the ex-
perimental data with respect to overconfidence, risk preferences, time preferences, and
social preferences.3 Still, we find that females are substantially less willing to compete
than males, which maps to the fact that the Scandinavian countries have very gender
segregated labor markets, both horizontally and vertically (Birkelund and Sandnes,
2003).4
Our study shows that a gender gap in competition preferences does not necessarily
reflect a lack of female empowerment, consistent with the finding in Schmitt, Realo,
Voracek, and Allik (2008) that gender differences in personality traits (Big Five) are
greater in prosperous, healthy, and egalitarian cultures. This may partly reflect a gene-
environment interaction, where the biological development of boys is more susceptible
to a stressful environment than that of girls. Thus, it may be the case that innate differ-
ences in competitiveness inclinations between boys and girls are attenuated by growing
up in a low socioeconomic family environment, but emerge for more well-off children
facing greater opportunities. Thus, from a policy perspective, it is crucial to iden-
tify whether a gender gap in competitiveness reflects a lack of female empowerment
or innate biological differences, where the latter make it more challenging to justify
policies aiming at promoting stronger competition preferences among females.
The present paper also speaks to the literature in labor economics that has docu-
2Booth and Nolen (2012) also provide evidence suggesting that socialisation is an important driver of
the gender gap in competitiveness. They study girls from single-sex schools and coeducational schools
in UK, and find that the girls from single-sex schools are more likely to compete in the experiment than
girls from coeducational schools.
3For further details on the gender equality index, see hdr.undp.org/en/media/
4See also Ca´rdenas, Dreber, von Essen, and Ranehill (2011), who find a larger gender difference in
competitiveness in a highly gender equal Scandinavian country (Sweden) than in a much less gender
equal Latin American country (Columbia).
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mented that there is a strong intergenerational correlation in income and educational
attainment between fathers and sons (Bowles and Gintis, 2002), and to recent work
arguing that father presence appears to be crucial for this association (Baker and Mil-
ligan, 2013; Bertrand and Pan, 2013; Gould and Simhon, 2011; Kalil, Mogstad, Rege,
and Votruba, 2013).5 Our study suggests that the father’s role in shaping competi-
tion preferences may be an important underlying mechanism, where medium and high
SES fathers are more present than low SES fathers and cultivate a greater willingness
to compete in their sons that may benefit them later in their career. Interestingly, this
mechanism may also shed light on the observation in Ca´rdenas et al. (2011) of a larger
gender gap in the more gender equal society, since more gender equality typically
would imply that fathers spend more time at home with their children.6
The paper unfolds as follows: Section 2 describes the sample and the data, whereas
Section 3 gives an overview of the experimental design. Section 4 provides a descrip-
tive analysis, where we break down the data by both gender and socioeconomic status
of the family. In Section 5, we report the main analysis on what explains the willing-
ness to compete, whereas Section 6 studies in more detail potential mechanisms in the
family that may shape competition preferences. Section 7 discusses some implications
for field choices and offers some concluding remarks. In Appendix A, we present the
complete regression estimates and further robustness analysis.
2 Sample and data
The participants were recruited among Norwegian adolescents in 9th grade, 14-15
years old. 9th grade is compulsory in Norway and almost all children attend public
schools (97.2%). We randomly selected 11 public middle schools in Bergen, which is
the second largest city in Norway and close to the national average of the Norwegian
urban population with respect to the distribution of income, education and occupa-
tion. Two schools later withdrew due to practical circumstances. At each school we
randomly selected two classes, and all the students in the selected classes received a
personal invitation to participate in the experiment. Participation was voluntary and
both students and their parents had to consent to participation. The participation rate
was high; 523 out of 602 invited students took part in the experiment (87%). In the ex-
perimental session, which is explained in more detail in the next section, we collected
both incentivized behavioral data and non-incentivized survey data.
In collaboration with Statistics Norway, we matched the data from the experiment
to Norwegian register data, which is a linked national administrative high quality data
set. We have detailed parental background information on education and income for
5See also the growing literature on the role of noncognitive abilities on labor market outcomes and
social behavior (Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006).
6There may certainly be other effects of gender equality working in the opposite direction, including
a change in the father’s role.
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483 of the 523 children.7 Table 1 shows that our sample of parents is largely represen-
tative for the urban Norwegian population. From panel A, we observe that there is a
slightly lower share of parents with at least some college education in the sample com-
pared to the population at large (44.1% versus 50.0% for fathers, 48.6% versus 53.4%
for mothers), but also a slightly lower share of parents with only compulsory educa-
tion (15.1% versus 17.8% for fathers, 16.9% versus 18.3% for mothers). As shown in
panel B, the mean earnings of the parents in our sample are slightly higher than in the
representative population (9.7% for fathers, 5.5% for mothers), but overall the income
distributions of the sample and the representative population are very similar.
[ Table 1 about here. ]
It is also interesting to observe from Table 1 that, both in our sample and in the
population at large, there is a slightly larger share of mothers than fathers with some
college education, which reflects the long history of gender equalizing policies in Nor-
way. At the same time, we also observe that the mothers have significantly lower
incomes than the fathers, consistent with the fact that Norway has very gender segre-
gated labor markets (Birkelund and Sandnes, 2003).
3 Experimental design
We conducted ten experimental sessions at NHH Norwegian School of Economics,
where each session lasted for approximately two hours and used a web-based interface.
All students received a show-up fee of 50 NOK (approximately 8 USD), in addition to
what they earned in the lab experiment. The participants were not given any feedback
on the different incentivized parts of the experiment until the end of the session. They
were then given an overview of the outcomes and paid the sum of what they had
earned in each part. The average total payment from the experiment was 361 NOK.
The experiment was double blind, i.e., neither participants nor experimenters could
associate decisions with particular participants.8
The experimental session consisted of two parts, an incentivized part and a non-
incentivized part. In the incentivized part, we measured competition preferences, so-
cial preferences, risk preferences, time preferences, and the participants’ knowledge
7For 28 children, we have some background information, whereas 12 children could not be matched
to the register data.
8Special care was taken so that the payment procedure ensured participant-experimenter anonymity.
At the end of the experiment the computer assigned a payment code to each of the participants, and
a group of assistants, who were not present in the lab during the experiment, prepared envelopes con-
taining the payments corresponding to each payment code. The assistants also made sure that it was
impossible to identify the amount of money by simply looking at the envelope. After bringing the en-
velopes to the lab, the assistants immediately left and the envelopes were handed out in accordance
with the payment codes. A similar procedure was implemented for payments from the time preference
decisions.
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of the labor market. In the nonincentivized part, we collected data on psychological
traits using the Big Five Inventory (John, Donahue, and Kentle, 1991; Benet-Martı´nez
and John, 1998), time use, family and individual background characteristics, the par-
ticipants’ subjective evaluation of subjects at school, occupations and job character-
istics, fairness views and their general knowledge of society.9 The complete set of
instructions is provided in an online web-appendix, in the following we focus on the
behavioral games used to measure preferences.
In measuring competition preferences, we largely followed the approach of Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007). First, participants were asked to add sets of four two-digit num-
bers over a three minute period under a competitive tournament scheme, where they
earned 50 NOK if they got at least as many correct answers as the mean score in the
same session, and otherwise zero. A timer on their computer screen, which informed
the participants of how much time was left, and the number of correct answers was
updated each time the participant moved to a new set of four two-digit numbers.
Second, without receiving any feedback on their performance in the first round,
they were told to do the same task again for another three minutes. In this round, they
could choose between being compensated with a fixed piece rate of 1 NOK per correct
answer or enter into a competition where they received 3 NOK per correct answer if
they got at least as many points as the mean score in this session in the first round, and
otherwise zero.
We also collected data on their confidence in the competitiveness game. Before
they started working in the first round, we asked them to state how well they be-
lieved that they would perform on the task relative to the other participants in their
session. Specifically, they were asked to state the fraction (in deciles) of participants
they believed would do better than them on the task, which gives us a measure of their
confidence. Comparing the participants’ answers to this question with their actual
performance provides us with a measure of their overconfidence.
To get a measure of their risk preferences, we asked the participants to choose be-
tween a safe alternative and a risky alternative in a structured sequence of situations
(Holt and Laury, 2002). Correspondingly, to get a measure of time preferences we
asked the participants to choose in a structured sequence of situations between receiv-
ing a sum of money today or a larger sum of money after three weeks. In the following
analysis, we use the number of times a participant chose the risky option and the later
option as proxies of their risk and time preferences, but our results are not sensitive
to alternative measures of these preferences. Finally, to measure social preferences,
we conducted a version of a real effort dictator game (Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tun-
godden, 2010). First, we asked all participants to work on a math task where they
earned a fixed sum of money plus a bonus that depended on their performance relative
to that of the others. We then matched each participant with another participant with
9Heckman (2011) and Becker, Deckers, Dohmen, Falk, and Kosse (2012) show that economic pref-
erences and psychological personality measures are complementary in explaining life outcomes and
behavior.
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the same performance record and asked them to decide how they would distribute the
sum of the fixed payments between themselves and the other participant. The share
given to the other participant provides us with a measure of their level of selfishness.
To measure whether the participants had an egalitarian or a meritocratic fairness view,
we followed the impartial spectator approach of Cappelen, Konow, Sørensen, and Tun-
godden (2013). Specifically, we asked all participants to decide as impartial spectators
how the bonus earned by two other participants should be distributed, where they could
choose between an equal division (egalitarian fairness view) or a division in proportion
to the productivity of the two participants (meritocratic fairness view).
4 Descriptive statistics
In this section we provide an overview of gender and socioeconomic differences in our
sample.
4.1 Gender differences
We find a large gender difference in the willingness to compete in the present experi-
ment. As shown in Table 2a, boys are much more likely than girls to choose competi-
tion (51.6% versus 32.2%).10
[ Tables 2a and 2b and about here. ]
We also find a gender difference in performance in the first round, where boys score
higher than girls (11.0 vs. 9.8 correct answers).11 But as shown in the upper left panel
of Figure 2, the gender difference in the willingness to compete applies to almost all
performance levels. Similarly, we observe from the upper right panel of Figure 2 that
the gender difference in competitiveness also applies to almost all confidence levels.
[ Figure 2 about here. ]
The gender difference in willingness to compete is particularly striking when we
compare it to the absence of gender differences in overconfidence, social preferences,
time preferences and risk preferences in our sample, as reported in Table 2a. Females
are often found to be less overconfident (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), more risk
10In Table A1 in Appendix A, we provide an overview of the experimental data for the full sample
of 505 participants. On all experimental variables, there are only minimal differences between the full
sample and the restricted sample of 485 participants for which we also have data on family background
(Tables 2a and 2b).
11Note that this does not necessarily imply that the girls are less able to do the task. The first round
was a tournament, and Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003); Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) show
that women may be less effective than men in competitive environments, even if they are able to perform
similarly in noncompetitive environments.
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averse (Croson and Gneezy, 2009), and more generous (Engel, 2011) than males, but
these gender patterns do not apply to Norwegian adolescents.12 This may reflect that
Norway is a highly gender equal society, which makes it even more intriguing to ob-
serve large gender differences in competition preferences.
On the Big Five personality measures, we observe that the girls score higher on
all dimensions, but the differences are only statistically significant for extraversion
and neuroticism. Overall, the observed gender differences in personality are in line
with what has been documented in other studies (Schmitt et al., 2008), where it also
has been shown that adolescence is a key period in the development of individual
personality (Soto, John, Gosling, and Potter, 2011).
Finally, we observe that there are no gender differences in family background,
which means that girls are not more likely to grow up in families with low socioeco-
nomic status. This is consistent with there not being a gender preference with respect
to children, which is as expected in a gender equal society.
4.2 Socioeconomic differences
In this subsection, we consider differences between children across socioeconomic
backgrounds, where we focus on the differences between children from low socioeco-
nomic families and the rest of the children.13 A participant is defined to be from a low
SES family if one of the parents has only compulsory schooling, the other has no more
than high-school education, and the total parental income (the sum of the incomes of
the mother and the father) is in the lowest 20th percentile of the income distribution of
total parental income. As we return to in the later analysis, our results are not sensitive
to the exact cut-off chosen in the definition of the low SES families.
From Table 2b we observe that there is a significant socioeconomic gradient in the
willingness to compete, where low SES children are much less likely than medium and
high SES children to choose competition (23.1% versus 43.9%). The low SES children
perform, as expected, significantly worse than the medium and high SES children
on the task (8.4 versus 10.6 correct answers), whereas we do not find a statistically
significant difference between the two groups in overconfidence. The socioeconomic
gradient in the willingness to compete is persistent across performance and confidence
levels, as shown in the bottom panels of Figure 2,
On the other experimental measures, we observe, in particular, that the low SES
children are much more likely than the medium and high SES children to choose an
egalitarian (and not a meritocratic) division of the bonus as impartial spectator (51.3%
versus 24.8%). The low SES children also give away a smaller share in the dictator
12Our findings on social preferences are in line with Alma˚s, Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden
(2010), who also do not find a gender difference in the level of selfishness and the fairness views in a
representative sample of Norwegian adolescents.
13There are only small differences between children from medium and high socioeconomic families,
see Table A2 in Appendix A.
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game and are less patient, but these differences are not statistically significant.14 We
do not observe any difference in risk preferences between the two groups.
On the personality measures, we observe that the low SES children score lower
on openness, extraversion, and agreeableness and higher on neuroticisim, but only the
difference in agreeableness is statistically significant. Finally, by definition, there are
large differences between the two groups in family background variables. The father’s
income is on average twice as high for the medium and high SES children, the mother’s
income is on average 54% higher. The parents in the high SES also, on average, have
3.5 more years of education than parents in low SES families.
5 Explaining willingness to compete
In this subsection, we study in more detail how gender and socioeconomic background
are associated with the participants’ willingness to compete.
Table 3, which reports from a linear probability regression, confirms that there is a
highly statistically significant gender difference in the choice of whether to compete.15
This gender difference in competitiveness is robust to controlling for performance and
confidence, other experimental variables, psychological variables, and family back-
ground. The estimated effect of gender on the competition choice is lower when
including the performance variable (13.9 percentage points versus 19.4 percentage
points), which is as expected given the gender difference in performance, but not sen-
sitive to the inclusion of the other variables. In all specifications, the gender effect is
highly significant, and thus our study clearly demonstrates that even in a gender equal
society, girls are more averse to competition than boys.
[ Table 3 about here. ]
Table 4, however, shows that family background is also closely linked to the com-
petition choice. Low SES children are much less willing to compete than medium and
high SES children, the estimated difference without any controls being 20.8 percent-
age points. We observe that this partly works through the low SES children performing
worse on the task; controlling for performance reduces the estimated effect of low SES
to 12.2 percentage points. The inclusion of the other variables only marginally affects
the estimated effect, and even when including all background variables, we observe
that the estimated low SES effect on competition is as large as the estimated gender
effect reported in column (5) in Table 3.
14These findings may clearly differ across cultures. Bauer, Chytilova´, and Pertold-Gebicka (2012),
for example, find in a study conducted in the Czech Republic that children of parents with low education
are more spiteful, more selfish and less altruistic. See also Buechel, Khadjavi, and Nicklisch (2013),
who report from a field study that looks at how the willingness to compete among pre-school children
in Germany is related to the ambitions and preferences of their parents.
15In Appendix A, we report the full regression results for this and later tables reported in this and the
following section (Table A3 - Table A7).
9
[ Table 4 about here. ]
In Table 5, we consider whether family background affects boys and girls differ-
ently in their competition choice, by introducing an interaction variable between fam-
ily background and gender. We observe that that there is a large and highly significant
negative effect on the willingness to compete for boys coming from low SES families,
but no such effect for girls. The estimated effect of low SES for boys is 24 percentage
points and highly statistically significant, whereas the estimated effect for girls is 1.8
percentage points and not statistically significant. From the estimated interaction term,
we observe that the difference in how family background affects boys and girls is sta-
tistically significant. In Appendix A, we show that the estimated effects of low SES
are not sensitive to the exact definition of this group (Figure A2) or to the inclusion of
a separate dummy for high SES (Table A6).
[ Table 5 about here. ]
To summarize, we find that both gender and family background are important fac-
tors for understanding competition preferences, and, in particular, that family back-
ground is strongly negatively associated with a willingness to compete for boys. We
now turn to a further analysis of possible mechanisms that may explain how the family
shapes competition preferences.
6 Family mechanisms
In this section, we study mechanisms in the family that may potentially shape compet-
itiveness preferences. We do this by running the same type of regression as reported in
our main specification in column (5) in Table 5, but where we in some specifications
consider alternative definitions of low SES and in others replace the low SES dummy
with other family variables of interest.
First, we consider the relative importance of the socioeconomic status of the fa-
ther and the mother, to see whether there is evidence in the data of same-gender role
modeling (Bussey and Bandura, 1984). Is it the case that low SES fathers make boys
less willing to compete, whereas low SES mothers make girls less willing to com-
pete? In columns (2) and (3) in Table 6, we report separate regressions for low SES
being defined by one of the parent’s education and income. We observe from column
(2) that having a low SES father has a huge negative effect on boys’ willingness to
compete, but no statistically significant effect on girls. We do not find the same-sex
pattern for the mothers, however, as seen from column (3). In fact, the pattern for low
SES mothers is the same as for low SES fathers, but the estimated effects are smaller
and not statistically significant. Thus, it appears that our finding of low SES family
background being detrimental for willingness to compete is primarily driven by the
negative effect of the fathers on the boys.
10
[ Table 6 about here. ]
Second, we turn to family mechanisms that are not directly related to the low SES
status of the family, but still may be important in shaping competition preferences: the
level of equality between the parents, the number of siblings, and birth order. Parental
equality typically comes with more liberal gender-role attitudes (Myers and Booth,
2002; Bertrand, Pan, and Kamenica, 2013), and it seems plausible to assume that tra-
ditional gender roles are associated with boys being more competitive than girls. We
might therefore expect the gender gap in competitiveness to be narrower in families
with greater parental equality. There is, however, no evidence of this mechanism in
our data, as shown in columns (4) and (5) in Table 6. We here proxy equality between
parents with the relative income difference between fathers and mothers (4) and the
absolute difference in years of education (5), but for neither specification do we see
any effect on the willingness to compete for girls or boys.16
Further, we consider whether the number of siblings or birth order have an impact
on the competition preferences. Sibling rivalry has been extensively studied both in
animal and human behavior, where the basic idea is that siblings are competitors for
parents’ resources (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2005; Downey, 2001). One might
therefore expect that children with more siblings are more used to competition, and
thus also more willing to enter into competitive environments. For the same reason,
one might expect that the first-born is less competitive, since the first-born typically is
less exposed to competition from siblings.17 As shown in columns (5) and (6) in Ta-
ble 6, our estimates are in the expected direction both for boys and girls. More siblings
make you more competitive (6) and being the first-born makes you less competitive
(7), but the effects are relatively small and not statistically significant.
To summarize, our analysis suggests that the father’s socioeconomic status is the
most important family mechanism in shaping competition preferences among boys.18
One possible explanation for this finding is the combination of two forces; medium
and high SES fathers spend more developmentally effective time with their children
than low SES fathers (Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney, 2008; Rege and Solli, 2013); and
fathers serving a distinct parenting role (Kalil, Ugaz, and Guryan, 2011). Fathers
16In Table A8 in Appendix A, we provide descriptive statistics on the family variables used in Table 6.
Further, in Table A9, we report the results for a specification where the proxy for parental equality is a
dummy for whether the mother earns more than the father or for whether the father has more education
than the mother. It has been shown in other studies that the social norm “a man should earn more
than his wife” is crucial for understanding important labor market and family outcomes (Bertrand et al.,
2013), but we do not find any evidence of this mechanism shaping the competition preferences of the
children.
17Recent evidence from China suggests that the role of siblings in shaping competitiveness prefer-
ences is potentially of great importance. Cameron, Erkal, Gangadharan, and Meng (2013) find that the
one-child policy had a detrimental effect on individuals’ competition preferences. We only have 15
children with no siblings and thus are not able to distinguish between the effect of being first born and
being an only child.
18We also show in Table A10 in Appendix A that the father’s socioeconomic status does not affect
the performance, risk, or confidence of the boys and girls in a way that can explain our findings.
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typically engage with their children in more competitive activities, like sports, and
also spend more time with their sons than their daughters (Lundberg, 2005; Baker and
Milligan, 2013), and the fact that medium and high SES boys are particularly exposed
to these activities and the competitive culture encompassing them may make them
more attracted to competition also later in life.19
The fact that we find much weaker evidence of the father’s socioeconomic status
shaping the competition preferences of the girls may also reflect a gene-environment
interaction. In particular, it may be the case that innate differences in competition
preferences are allowed to develop more in the medium and high SES families, where
children face more opportunities (Schmitt et al., 2008). 20 Our findings are also con-
sistent with girls being less responsive to the competitive culture of a medium and high
SES father because they are biologically less inclined to compete.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that family matters for competition preferences. In particular, our
findings suggest that the fathers play an important role in shaping the competition
preferences of the boys, where boys with low SES fathers are much less willing to
compete than boys with high SES fathers. We do not find a similar pattern for girls,
and as a consequence we find that gender differences in competitiveness are sensitive
to family background. We do not observe any gender difference in competitiveness
among children from low SES families, but a large and significant gender difference
among children from medium and high SES families.
Our results shed light on the ongoing debate on the role of nature versus nurture
in explaining gender differences in competition preferences. The fact that fathers play
a specific role in shaping the competition preferences of boys is consistent with the
gender gap reflecting a socialization process, and in this respect we complement the
study of Gneezy et al. (2009) by showing that the family institution is a crucial part of
the nurture process. But our study is also consistent with nature playing a role, where
gene-environment interactions may explain why girls react less to family background
than do boys.
The present paper also contributes to explaining the intergenerational association
between fathers and sons in educational and income attainment. Our study suggests
that medium and high SES fathers to a greater extent than low SES fathers cultivate
a willingness to compete in their sons that may benefit them in later educational and
19There is also evidence showing that parents in general engage differently with sons and daughters,
for example by reading more to the daughters (Bertrand and Pan, 2013). This is consistent with our
finding the same low SES pattern, even though weaker, for mothers.
20Sutter and Ru¨tzler (2010) find gender differences in competition preferences early in life, which
is suggestive of there being innate biological differences in competition preferences. See also Guo
and Stearns (2002); Turkheimer, Haley, Waldron, D’Onofrio, and Gottesman (2003) for studies of how
socioeconomic status and genetic dispositions may interact in the context of the intellectual development
of children.
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labor market choices. Recent evidence shows that competitiveness preferences are
indeed predictive of educational choices in adolescence (Buser et al., Forthcoming),
and we provide evidence suggesting that this also applies to labor market choices. As
shown in Figure 3, children choosing to compete in the experiment are much more
likely to find competitive (and typically high paid) occupations more attractive than
children choosing not to compete (p< 0.01).
[ Figure 3 about here. ]
Differences in competition preferences initially due to socialization in adolescence
may over time manifest themselves in neural structures that have lasting implications
for choices also made in adulthood (Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron, and Shonkoff,
2006). This may provide justification for policies targeting low SES children with in-
terventions that may give them the opportunity to cultivate competition preferences,
which at the same time should respect the inherent variation in competitiveness incli-
nations between and within the genders.
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low ses m/h ses
males
females
Note: The figure reports the share of the participants that chose to compete by gender
and family background. A participant is defined to be from a low SES family if one
of the parents has only compulsory schooling, the other has no more than high-school
education, and the total parental income (the sum of the incomes of the mother and
the father) is in the lowest 20th percentile of the income distribution of total parental
income. The standard errors are indicated.
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Note: The upper left panel shows the share of boys and girls that chose to compete
by actual performance in the first round (defined by the decile of the performance
distribution they belong to). The upper right panel shows the share of boys and
girls that chose to compete by confidence (defined by the decile of the performance
distribution they believe they belong to). The lower left panel shows the share of
low SES and medium and high (m/h) SES participants that chose to compete by
performance. The lower right panel shows the share of low SES and m/h SES
participants that chose to compete by confidence. A participant is defined to be from
a low SES family if one of the parents has only compulsory schooling, the other has
no more than high-school education, and the total parental income (the sum of the
incomes of the mother and the father) is in the lowest 20th percentile of the income
distribution of total parental income. The rest of the participants are defined to be
from medium and high SES families.
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Note: The figure reports the participants’ subjective evaluation of occupations (on a
scale from 1 (low) to 7 (high)), where it was stated that the evaluation should be con-
ditional on the income being the same in all occupations. We report the difference in
subjective evaluation between the three most competitive occupations (lawyer, stock-
broker, and self-employed) and the other occupations (electrician, nurse, bureaucrat
for the municipality, fire-fighter, actor, and journalist). The average difference is re-
ported separately for the participants who chose not to compete (“not competing”) and
those who chose to compete (“competing”). The standard errors are indicated.
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Table 1: Parental background: Comparison of sample and population
Father Mother
population sample population sample
A. Education
Only compulsary education 0.178 0.151 0.183 0.169
(0.016) (0.017)
Some secondary education 0.322 0.408 0.283 0.345
(0.022) (0.021)
At least some college 0.500 0.441 0.534 0.486
(0.022) (0.022)
B. Income
Mean income 569 624 345 364
(22) (9)
10th percentile 128 302 0 173
(17) (10)
25th percentile 342 403 194 245
(10) (8)
50th percentile 487 527 333 342
(16) (8)
75th percentile 708 754 448 433
(22) (9)
90th percentile 1007 1009 606 541
(33) (28)
Note: In panel A, we report the share of individuals in each category of education,
where “population” refers to the full population having children in the 1996 cohort in
one of the larger cities (Oslo, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim), weighted by the number
of such children, and “sample” refers to the parents of the 485 participants for which
we have data on family background. In panel B, we report the mean and the distribution
of income in thousands 2009 NOK (from administrative register data, using the social
insurance definition of income). Standard errors in parentheses (for the sample only).
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Table 2a: Overview of differences by gender
means std.dev. p-value
boys girls boys girls (equal means)
Variables pertaining to the competition game
Compete 0.516 0.322 0.501 0.468 < 0.001
Performance 10.98 9.82 4.979 4.372 < 0.001
Confidence 57.88 51.70 18.34 16.96 < 0.001
Overconfidence 1.120 0.601 26.70 29.15 0.839
Other experimental measures
Risk 3.636 3.652 2.274 2.134 0.935
Patience 4.268 4.030 2.122 1.901 0.194
Selfish 0.306 0.310 0.243 0.230 0.858
Egalitarian 0.268 0.270 0.444 0.445 0.953
Personality
Openness 0.307 0.354 0.435 0.404 0.221
Conscientiousness 0.428 0.477 0.485 0.452 0.247
Extraversion 0.379 0.450 0.374 0.411 0.048
Agreeableness 0.711 0.760 0.349 0.407 0.158
Neuroticism -0.572 -0.362 0.426 0.466 < 0.001
Background
Father education (yrs) 14.01 14.27 2.84 2.82 0.326
Mother education (yrs) 14.26 14.09 2.66 2.82 0.502
Father average income (1000s) 550 544 198 245 0.857
Mother average income (1000s) 322 321 158 145 0.917
Continued next page.
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Table 2b: Overview of differences by SES
means std.dev. p-value
m/h SES low SES m/h SES low SES (equal means)
Variables pertaining to the competition game
Compete 0.440 0.211 0.497 0.413 0.006
Performance 10.61 8.18 4.703 4.489 0.003
Confidence 55.90 43.16 17.62 17.68 < 0.001
Overconfidence 0.652 3.421 27.758 29.526 0.580
Other experimental measures
Risk 3.38 3.711 2.175 2.567 0.867
Patience 4.187 3.763 2.025 1.937 0.204
Egalitarian 0.248 0.526 0.432 0.506 < 0.001
Selfish 0.311 0.277 0.236 0.247 0.421
Personality
Openness 0.338 0.240 0.415 0.475 0.227
Conscientiousness 0.454 0.427 0.470 0.467 0.735
Extraversion 0.418 0.352 0.392 0.410 0.341
Agreeableness 0.745 0.608 0.372 0.436 0.067
Neuroticism -0.477 -0.399 0.454 0.501 0.363
Background
Father education (yrs) 14.41 10.81 2.741 1.431 < 0.001
Mother education (yrs) 14.45 11.03 2.653 1.385 < 0.001
Father average income (1000s) 570 288 348 88.3 < 0.001
Mother average income (1000s) 332 210 153 65.8 < 0.001
Note: The upper and lower panels report the variables by gender and SES (m/h and low) for the restricted
sample of 485 participants for which we have data on family background. “Compete”: indicator variable
taking the value one if the participant chose to compete. “Performance”: the number of correct answers
on the addition task in the first round. “Confidence”: the participant’s belief about own performance
(defined as the percentage of participants in the session that the participant believed performed worse
than him- or herself). “Overconfidence”: the difference between “Performance” (here defined as the
percentage of participants in the session that performed worse than the participant) and “Confidence”.
“Risk”: the number of times the risky alternative was chosen. “Patience”: the number of times the later
option was chosen. “Selfish”: share given to the other participant. “Egalitarian”: indicator variable
taking the value one if the participant divided equally as spectator. “Personality” is measured by the Big
Five Inventory. The background variables are taken from administrative register data, where “education”
refers to years of schooling and “income” is in thousands 2009 NOK, averaged over the past 10 years,
and includes transfers and capital incomes. A participant is defined to be from a low SES family if one
of the parents has only compulsory schooling, the other has no more than high-school education, and
the total parental income (the sum of the incomes of the mother and the father) is in the lowest 20th
percentile of the income distribution of total parental income. The rest of the participants are defined
to be from medium and high SES families. The p-values refer to the Pearson’s chi-squared test for the
indicator variables and to t-tests of equality with unequal variances for all the other variables.
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Table 3: Effect of gender on willingness to compete.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.194∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
Performance 0.023∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Overconfidence 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Included controls:
Experimental variables no no no yes yes yes
Big Five personality no no no no yes yes
Low SES no no no no no yes
Observations 483 483 483 483 483 483
R2 0.039 0.085 0.118 0.173 0.186 0.191
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of the indicator value “Compete” (taking the
value one if the participant chose to compete) on a set of explanatory variables.
“Female”: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is a female.
“Performance”: the number of correct answers on the addition task in the first
round. “Overconfidence”: the difference between “Performance” (here defined as the
percentage of participants in the session that performed worse than the participant)
and “Confidence” (defined as the percentage of participants in the session that the
participant believed performed worse than him- or herself). “Experimental variables:
“Risk”, “Patience”, “Selfish”, and “Egalitarian” (see Table 2 for definitions). “Big
Five personality: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and
Neuroticism. “Low SES”: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is
from a low SES family, that is, if one of the parents has only compulsory schooling,
the other has no more than high-school education, and the total parental income (the
sum of the incomes of the mother and the father) is in the lowest 20th percentile of the
income distribution of total parental income. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4: Effect of low SES on willingness to compete.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low SES -0.230∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗ -0.134∗∗ -0.122∗ -0.132∗ -0.139∗
(0.070) (0.071) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.071)
Performance 0.024∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Overconfidence 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Included controls:
Experimental variable no no no yes yes yes
Big Five personality no no no no yes yes
Female no no no no no yes
Observations 483 483 483 483 483 483
R2 0.016 0.066 0.103 0.158 0.174 0.191
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of the indicator value “Compete” (taking the value
one if the participant chose to compete) on a set of explanatory variables. “Low SES”:
indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is from a low SES family,
that is, if one of the parents has only compulsory schooling, the other has no more
than high-school education, and the total parental income (the sum of the incomes of
the mother and the father) is in the lowest 20th percentile of the income distribution
of total parental income. Standard errors in parentheses. “Performance”: the number
of correct answers on the addition task in the first round. “Overconfidence”: the
difference between “Performance” (here defined as the percentage of participants in
the session that performed worse than the participant) and “Confidence” (defined as
the percentage of participants in the session that the participant believed performed
worse than him- or herself). “Experimental variables: “Risk”, “Patience”, “Selfish”,
and “Egalitarian” (see Table 2 for definitions). “Big Five personality: Openness,
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism. “Female”: indi-
cator variable taking the value one if the participant is a female. Standard errors in
parentheses.
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Table 5: Willingness to compete: Interaction between low ses and gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low SES -0.343∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.096) (0.091) (0.085) (0.081)
Female -0.213∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
Low SES X female 0.235∗ 0.226 0.232∗ 0.325∗∗ 0.304∗∗
(0.141) (0.140) (0.132) (0.127) (0.127)
Low SES (female) -0.108 -0.061 -0.023 0.042 0.025
(0.104) (0.104) (0.099) (0.101) (0.104)
Included controls:
Performance no yes yes yes yes
Overconfidence no no yes yes yes
Experimental variables no no no yes yes
Big Five personality no no no no yes
Observations 483 483 483 483 483
R2 0.059 0.099 0.128 0.186 0.198
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of the indicator value “Compete” (taking the value one if the par-
ticipant chose to compete) on a set of explanatory variables. “Low SES”: indicator variable taking the
value one if the participant is from a low SES family, that is, if one of the parents has only compulsory
schooling, the other has no more than high-school education, and the total parental income (the sum of
the incomes of the mother and the father) is in the lowest 20th percentile of the income distribution of
total parental income. Standard errors in parentheses. “Female”: indicator variable taking the value one
if the participant is a female. “Low SES X Female” is an interaction variable between “Low SES” and
“Female”. “Low SES (Female)”: the sum of the estimated parameters for “Low SES” and “Low SES X
Female”. “Performance”: the number of correct answers on the addition task in the first round. “Over-
confidence”: the difference between “Performance” (here defined as the percentage of participants in
the session that performed worse than the participant) and “Confidence” (defined as the percentage of
participants in the session that the participant believed performed worse than him- or herself). “Exper-
imental variables: “Risk”, “Patience”, “Selfish”, and “Egalitarian” (see Table 2 for definitions). “Big
Five personality: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6: Regressions of willingness to compete: Family mechanisms
Low SES Parental power difference Siblings
Father / Father’s − Number of
Parents Father Mother Mothers inc. Mother’s edu. siblings Firstborn
Family -0.279∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.137 0.004 -0.010 0.006 -0.095
(0.081) (0.082) (0.126) (0.007) (0.033) (0.029) (0.061)
Female -0.162∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.162∗ -0.162∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.051) (0.044) (0.088) (0.056)
Family X Female 0.304∗∗ 0.316∗∗ 0.175 0.006 -0.010 0.014 0.053
(0.127) (0.159) (0.182) (0.010) (0.048) (0.041) (0.088)
Family (Female) 0.025 0.050 0.038 0.010 -0.020 0.020 -0.042
(0.104) (0.138) (0.131) (0.007) (0.035) (0.028) (0.063)
Included controls:
Performance yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Overconfidence yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Experimental variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Big Five personality yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 483 476 481 483 474 483 483
R2 0.198 0.201 0.187 0.188 0.190 0.187 0.191
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of the indicator value “Compete” (taking the value one if the
participant chose to compete) on a set of explanatory variables. “Family” differs across the six
specifications. “Family (Parents)”: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is from a
low SES family, that is, if one of the parents has only compulsory schooling, the other has no more
than high-school education, and the total parental income (the sum of the incomes of the mother and
the father) is in the lowest 20th percentile of the income distribution of total parental income. “Family
(father)”: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant has a low SES father, that is, if the
father only has compulsory schooling and is in the lowest 20th percentile of the income distribution
of the fathers. “Family (mother)”: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant has a low
SES mother, that is, if the mother only has compulsory schooling and is in the lowest 20th percentile of
the income distribution of the mothers. “Family (Father’s - Mother’s inc)”: Father’s income divided by
the mother’s income. “Family (Father’s - Mother’s edu)”: Father’s years of education minus mother’s
years of education. “Family (Siblings)”: Number of siblings. “Family (Firstborn)”: indicator variable
taking the value one if the participant is the firstborn in the family. “Female”: indicator variable taking
the value one if the participant is a female. “Family X Female” is an interaction variable between
“Family” and “Female”. “Family (Female)”: the sum of the estimated parameters for “Family” and
“Family X Female”. “Performance”: the number of correct answers on the addition task in the first
round. “Overconfidence”: the difference between “Performance” (here defined as the percentage of
participants in the session that performed worse than the participant) and “Confidence” (defined as
the percentage of participants in the session that the participant believed performed worse than him-
or herself). “Experimental variables: “Risk”, “Patience”, “Selfish”, and “Egalitarian” (see Table 2 for
definitions). “Big Five personality: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and
Neuroticism. Standard errors in parentheses. 27
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low ses medium ses high ses
males
females
Note: The figure reports the share of the participants that chose to compete by gender
and family background. A participant is defined to be from a low SES family if one
of the parents has only compulsory schooling, the other has no more than high-school
education, and the total parental income (the sum of the incomes of the mother and
the father) is in the lowest 20th percentile of the income distribution of total parental
income. A participant is defined to be from a high SES family if both parents have a
degree higher than high school and total parental income is above the 85th percentile
of the total parental income distribution. The cutoff at the 85th percentile is chosen
in order to make the high SES group of the same size as the low SES group. The
remaining participants are defined as coming from medium SES families. The standard
errors are indicated.
28























15 20 25 30

























15 20 25 30




Note: The graph shows the estimated effect of low SES for different cut-offs of income
in the definition of low SES, where the cut-off level is indicated by the x-axis The
specification estimated corresponds to (5) in Table 5 (with the full set of controls) In
the upper panel, the low SES definition includes the education and income of both the
mother and the father; in the lower panel, the low SES definition includes the education
and income of only the father. Standard errors are indicated.
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Table A1: Experimental data by gender, full sample from experiment.
means std.dev. p-value
boys girls boys girls (equal means)
Variables pertaining to the competition game
Compete 0.522 0.312 0.501 0.464 < 0.001
Performance 11.00 9.69 4.94 4.39 < 0.001
Confidence 57.98 52.04 18.31 17.08 < 0.001
Overconfidence 1.059 1.800 26.67 28.96 0.765
Other experimental measures
Risk 3.663 3.596 2.265 2.195 0.737
Patience 4.278 3.992 2.105 1.933 0.112
Selfish 0.303 0.322 0.243 0.229 0.372
Egalitarian 0.267 0.264 0.443 0.442 0.946
Personality
Openness 0.306 0.362 0.432 0.398 0.128
Conscientiousness 0.429 0.490 0.482 0.459 0.150
Extraversion 0.381 0.444 0.376 0.404 0.071
Agreeableness 0.712 0.762 0.352 0.403 0.137
Neuroticism -0.573 -0.358 0.425 0.471 < 0.001
Note: The upper and lower panels report the variables by gender and SES for the full sample of 505
participants. “Compete”: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant chose to compete.
“Performance”: the number of correct answers on the addition task in the first round. “Confidence”: the
participant’s belief about own performance (reported here as the percentage of participants in the session
that the participant believed performed worse than him- or herself). “Overconfidence”: the difference
between “Performance” (here defined as the percentage of participants in the session that performed
worse than the participant) and “Confidence”. “Risk”: the number of times the risky alternative was
chosen. “Patience”: the number of times the later option was chosen. “Selfish”: share given to the other
participant. “Egalitarian”: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant divided equally as
spectator. “Personality” is measured by the Big Five Inventory. The background variables are taken
from administrative register data, where “education” refers to years of schooling and “income” is in
thousands 2009 NOK, averaged over the past ten years, and includes transfers and capital incomes. A
participant is defined to be from a low SES family if one of the parents has only compulsory schooling,
the other has no more than high-school education, and the total parental income (the sum of the incomes
of the mother and the father) is in the lowest 20th percentile of the income distribution of total parental
income. The rest of the participants are defined to be from medium and high SES families. The p-values
refer to the Pearson’s chi-squared test for the indicator variables and to t-tests of equality with unequal
variances for all the other variables.
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Table A2: Overview of differences between high SES and medium SES
means std.dev. p-value
medium SES high SES medium SES high SES (equal means)
Variables pertaining to the competition experiment
Compete 0.435 0.500 0.496 0.506 0.426
Performance 10.44 12.30 4.72 4.20 0.011
Confidence 55.32 61.75 17.52 17.74 0.034
Overconfidence 1.210 -5.000 27.87 26.21 0.162
Other experimental measures
Risk 3.635 3.675 2.225 1.607 0.885
Patience 4.111 4.950 2.001 2.136 0.021
Egalitarian 0.252 0.200 0.434 0.405 0.468
Selfish 0.309 0.334 0.236 0.234 0.522
Personality
Openness 0.331 0.405 0.411 0.456 0.329
Conscientiousness 0.447 0.525 0.475 0.417 0.269
Extraversion 0.419 0.413 0.388 0.439 0.934
Agreeableness 0.740 0.799 0.376 0.327 0.289
Neuroticism -0.473 -0.514 0.455 0.444 0.580
Background
Father education (yrs) 14.09 17.70 2.623 1.400 < 0.001
Mother education (yrs) 14.18 17.23 2.575 1.693 < 0.001
Father average income (1000s) 517 1011 263 585 < 0.001
Mother average income (1000s) 318 465 139 214 < 0.001
Note: The table reports the variables by gender. “Compete”: indicator variable taking the value one if
the participant chose to compete. “Performance”: the number of correct answers on the addition task
in the first round. “Confidence”: the participant’s belief about own performance (reported here as the
percentage of participants in the session that the participant believed performed worse than him- or
herself). “Overconfidence”: the difference between “Performance” (here defined as the percentage of
participants in the session that performed worse than the participant) and “Confidence”. “Risk”: the
number of times the risky alternative was chosen. “Patience”: the number of times the later option was
chosen. “Selfish”: share given to the other participant. “Egalitarian”: indicator variable taking the value
one if the participant divided equally as spectator. “Personality” is measured by the Big Five Inventory.
The background variables are taken from administrative register data, where “education” refers to years
of schooling and “income” is in thousands 2009 NOK, averaged over the past ten years, and includes
transfers and capital incomes. A participant is defined to be from a high SES family if both parents
have a degree higher than high school and total parental income is above the 85th percentile of the
total parental income distribution. A participant is defined to be from a low SES family if one of the
parents has only compulsory schooling, the other has no more than high-school education, and the total
parental income (the sum of the incomes of the mother and the father) is in the lowest 20th percentile
of the income distribution of total parental income. A participant is defined to be from a high SES
family if both parents have a degree higher than high school and total parental income is above the
85th percentile of the total parental income distribution. The cutoff at the 85th percentile is chosen in
order to make the high SES group of same size as the low SES group. The remaining participants are
defined as coming from medium SES families. The p-values refer to the Pearson’s chi-squared test for
the indicator variables and to t-tests of equality with unequal variances for all the other variables.
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Table A3: Effect of gender on willingness to compete.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.194∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
Performance 0.023∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Overconfidence 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Risk 0.043∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Patience 0.029∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Egalitarian -0.049 -0.050 -0.038
(0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
Selfish -0.030 -0.030 -0.037
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
Missing selfish -0.062 -0.049 -0.034
(0.265) (0.250) (0.241)
BF extraversion 0.093 0.090
(0.057) (0.057)
BF agreeableness -0.040 -0.049
(0.059) (0.059)
BF conscientiousness 0.038 0.044
(0.047) (0.047)
BF neuroticism -0.062 -0.062
(0.052) (0.052)




Constant 0.516∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.039 -0.180∗∗ -0.190∗ -0.151
(0.032) (0.058) (0.074) (0.091) (0.101) (0.103)
Observations 483 483 483 483 483 483
R2 0.039 0.085 0.118 0.173 0.186 0.191
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: Table 3 in the paper - all parameters reported.
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Table A4: Effect of low SES on willingness to compete.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low SES -0.230∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗ -0.134∗∗ -0.122∗ -0.132∗ -0.139∗
(0.070) (0.071) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.071)
Performance 0.024∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Overconfidence 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Risk 0.043∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Patience 0.029∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Egalitarian -0.032 -0.032 -0.038
(0.049) (0.050) (0.050)
Selfish -0.038 -0.034 -0.037
(0.091) (0.091) (0.089)














Constant 0.440∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ -0.042 -0.273∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.151
(0.024) (0.052) (0.067) (0.085) (0.097) (0.103)
Observations 483 483 483 483 483 483
R2 0.016 0.066 0.103 0.158 0.174 0.191
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: Table 4 in the paper - all parameters reported.
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Table A5: Willingness to compete: Interaction between low SES and gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low SES -0.343∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.096) (0.091) (0.085) (0.081)
Female -0.213∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
Low SES X female 0.235∗ 0.226 0.232∗ 0.325∗∗ 0.304∗∗
(0.141) (0.140) (0.132) (0.127) (0.127)
Performance 0.021∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)






















Constant 0.543∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.083 -0.149 -0.154
(0.033) (0.061) (0.078) (0.094) (0.104)
Low SES (female) -0.108 -0.061 -0.023 0.042 0.025
(0.104) (0.104) (0.099) (0.101) (0.104)
Observations 483 483 483 483 483
R2 0.059 0.099 0.128 0.186 0.198
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: Table 5 in the paper - all parameters reported.
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Table A6: Willingness to compete: Interaction between low SES and gender, including
interaction effect and dummy for high SES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
high ses 0.096 0.044 0.027 -0.020 -0.014
(0.117) (0.112) (0.113) (0.108) (0.108)
low ses -0.336∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.097) (0.092) (0.085) (0.082)
high ses X female -0.040 -0.017 -0.003 0.036 0.034
(0.162) (0.159) (0.156) (0.147) (0.146)
low ses X female 0.233 0.225 0.232∗ 0.328∗∗ 0.307∗∗
(0.142) (0.141) (0.133) (0.128) (0.128)
Female -0.211∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
Performance 0.021∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Overconfidence 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Low SES (female) 0.056 0.027 0.023 0.016 0.020
(0.112) (0.114) (0.109) (0.100) (0.099)
High SES (female) -0.103 -0.059 -0.021 0.044 0.026
(0.104) (0.104) (0.100) (0.102) (0.105)
Included controls:
Performance no yes yes yes yes
Overconfidence no no yes yes yes
Experimental variables no no no yes yes
Big Five personality no no no no yes
Observations 483 483 483 483 483
R2 0.061 0.099 0.128 0.186 0.198
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: Corresponding to Table 5 in the paper, including a separate indicator variable for high SES. A
participant is defined to be from a high SES family if both parents have a degree higher than high school
and total parental income is above the 85th percentile of the total parental income distribution.
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Table A7: Regressions of willingness to compete: Family mechanisms
Low SES Parental power difference Siblings
Father / Father’s − Number of
Parents Father Mother mothers inc. mother’s edu. siblings Firstborn
Low SES -0.279∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.137 0.004 -0.010 0.006 -0.095
(0.081) (0.082) (0.126) (0.007) (0.033) (0.029) (0.061)
Female -0.162∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.162∗ -0.162∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.051) (0.044) (0.088) (0.056)
Low SES X female 0.304∗∗ 0.316∗∗ 0.175 0.006 -0.010 0.014 0.053
(0.127) (0.159) (0.182) (0.010) (0.048) (0.041) (0.088)
Performance 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Overconfidence 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Risk 0.046∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Patience 0.028∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Egalitarian -0.044 -0.053 -0.050 -0.050 -0.044 -0.051 -0.047
(0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Selfish -0.026 -0.032 -0.030 -0.034 -0.028 -0.024 -0.030
(0.088) (0.089) (0.090) (0.089) (0.091) (0.090) (0.089)
Missing selfish -0.064 -0.061 -0.052 -0.044 -0.039 -0.053 -0.068
(0.255) (0.260) (0.251) (0.248) (0.254) (0.250) (0.251)
Extraversion 0.088 0.093∗ 0.093 0.095∗ 0.101∗ 0.088 0.098∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Agreeableness -0.041 -0.031 -0.038 -0.039 -0.025 -0.040 -0.036
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060)
Conscientiousness 0.043 0.032 0.040 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.053
(0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048)
Neuroticism -0.059 -0.068 -0.058 -0.062 -0.058 -0.065 -0.058
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.053)
Openness -0.042 -0.038 -0.041 -0.036 -0.051 -0.036 -0.045
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051)
Constant -0.154 -0.167 -0.177∗ -0.200∗ -0.201∗∗ -0.209∗ -0.163
(0.104) (0.103) (0.103) (0.104) (0.101) (0.112) (0.104)
Family (female) 0.025 0.050 0.038 0.010 -0.020 0.020 -0.042
(0.104) (0.138) (0.131) (0.007) (0.035) (0.028) (0.063)
Observations 483 476 481 483 474 483 483
R2 0.198 0.201 0.187 0.188 0.190 0.187 0.191
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: Table 6 in the paper - all parameters reported.36
Table A8: Descriptive statistics: Other characteristics of the family
means std.dev. p-value
boys girls boys girls (equal means)
Family characteristics
Father’s relative income 2.315 2.259 3.227 3.017 0.846
Diff father’s and mother’s education -0.102 0.026 0.849 0.844 0.101
Number of siblings 1.864 1.961 1.032 1.100 0.316
Only child 0.436 0.365 0.497 0.482 0.111
Note: The table reports the descriptive statistics for the “Family” variables used in the four last columns
of table 6.
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Indicator X Female 0.027 -0.003
(0.102) (0.098)





Experimental variables yes yes
Big Five personality yes yes
Observations 483 483
R2 0.188 0.187
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of the indicator value “Compete” (taking the value one if the partic-
ipant chose to compete) on a set of explanatory variables. “Family” differs across the six specifications.
“Family (Income)”: indicator variable taking the value one if the mother has more income than the
father. “Family (Education)”: indicator variable taking the value one if the mother has more years
of education than the father. Female”: indicator variable taking the value one if the participant is a
female. “Family X Female” is an interaction variable between “Family” and “Female”. “Family (Fe-
male)”: the sum of the estimated parameters for “Family” and “Family X Female”. “Performance”:
the number of correct answers on the addition task in the first round. “Overconfidence”: the difference
between “Performance” (here defined as the percentage of participants in the session that performed
worse than the participant) and “Confidence” (defined as the percentage of participants in the session
that the participant believed performed worse than him- or herself). “Experimental variables: “Risk”,
“Patience”, “Selfish”, and “Egalitarian” (see Table 2 for definitions). “Big Five personality: Openness,
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A10: Regression of risk, performance and confidence: the effect of low SES
Low SES (parents) Low SES (father)
Risk Performance Confidence Risk Performance Confidence
Low SES 0.856 -1.714∗∗∗ -9.045∗∗ -0.093 -1.057 -6.878∗∗
(0.673) (0.631) (3.608) (0.604) (0.946) (3.271)
Female 0.124 -1.034∗∗∗ -4.684∗∗∗ 0.084 -0.962∗∗∗ -3.839∗∗
(0.220) (0.303) (1.595) (0.221) (0.296) (1.592)
Low SES X female -1.544∗ 0.049 2.725 -0.693 -0.504 -1.804
(0.790) (0.842) (5.473) (0.782) (1.147) (6.250)
Low SES (female) -0.688 -1.615*** -6.320 -0.786 -1.561** -8.682
(0.457) (0.550) (4.187) (0.500) (0.666) (5.313)
Performance yes no yes yes no yes
Overconfidence yes yes no yes yes no
Experimental variables yes* yes yes yes* yes yes
Big Five personality yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 483 483 483 476 476 476
R2 0.027 0.606 0.266 0.021 0.603 0.268
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Note: The table reports regressions of “Risk”, “Performance”, and “Confidence” on a set of explana-
tory variables (see Table 2 for definitions). “Low SES”: indicator variable taking the value one if the
participant is from a low SES family, that is, if one of the parents has only compulsory schooling,
the other has no more than high-school education, and the total parental income (the sum of the in-
comes of the mother and the father) is in the lowest 20th percentile of the income distribution of total
parental income. Standard errors in parentheses. “Female”: indicator variable taking the value one if
the participant is a female. “Low SES X Female” is an interaction variable between “Low SES” and
“Female”. “Low SES (Female)”: the sum of the estimated parameters for “Low SES” and “Low SES
X Female”. “Overconfidence”: the difference between “Performance” (here defined as the percentage
of participants in the session that performed worse than the participant) and “Confidence” (defined as
the percentage of participants in the session that the participant believed performed worse than him- or
herself). “Experimental variables: “Patience”, “Selfish”, and “Egalitarian” (see Table 2 for definitions).
“Big Five personality: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism.
Standard errors in parentheses. “yes*” indicates that “Risk” is excluded from the set of experimental
variables.
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